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THE EU EASTERN ENLARGEMENT AND FDI: THE IMPLICATIONS 
FROM A NEOCLASSICAL GROWTH MODEL 
 





This paper studies how the EU Eastern enlargement can aﬀect the economies of the 
old and the new EU members and the non-acceded countries in the context of a 
multi-country neoclassical growth model where Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is 
subject to border costs. We assume that in the moment of the EU enlargement border 
costs are eliminated between the old and the new EU member states but they remain 
unchanged between the old EU member states and the nonacceded countries. In a 
calibrated version of the model, the short-run eﬀects of the EU enlargement proved 
to be relatively small for all the economies considered. The long-run eﬀects are 
however significant: in the acceded countries, investors from the old EU member 
states become permanent owners of about 3/4 of capital, while in the nonacceded 
countries, they are forced out of business by local producers. 
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
On May 1, 2004, eight Central East European (CEE) transition countries,
Cyprus and Malta joined the EU, which had been composed of 15 developed
countries.1 This EU enlargement is an unprecedented attempt of political
and economic integration by its scope, diversity and possible consequences.
The channels through which the EU enlargement can aﬀect the economies in
the region are various: monetary union, FDI, migration, trade, etc.2 In this
paper, we focus on one of such channels, FDI. We argue that this channel
is important because there is a large diﬀerence between the capital stocks
and hence, between the Marginal Productivities of Capital (MPC) of the
EU15 and the non-EU15 transition countries, which is likely to generate
large capital ﬂows from the former to the latter countries.3
Concerning the previous EU enlargements, the empirical literature ﬁnds
that poor countries acceded the EU experienced a subsequent increase in FDI
inﬂows, e.g., Baldwin, Francois and Portes (1997), Grabbe (2001). Further-
more, in the wake of the 2004 EU enlargement, there were large diﬀerences in
FDI stocks between the acceding and the non-acceding transition countries,
see, e.g., Egger and Pfaﬀermayr (2002) and Henriot (2003). In the paper, we
argue that the above FDI patterns arise because an accession of a country to
the EU reduces the costs that the EU15 agents incur when investing in such
a country (we refer to such costs as ”border costs”).
We introduce border costs in a multi-country neoclassical growth model.
We ﬁrst consider a two-country variant of the model where one country rep-
resents the EU15 and the other represents the newly acceded countries. We
assume that border costs between the EU15 and the acceded countries are
eliminated after the EU accession. With this model, we ask: How can the
EU enlargement aﬀect output, consumption, labor and welfare of the EU15
and the acceded countries?
We then consider a three-country setup, where the three countries cor-
respond to the EU15, the acceded and the non-acceded groups of countries.
We assume that in the moment of accession, the border costs are entirely
1Further in the text, we therefore refer to the EU existing before the enlargement as
the EU15 and to the enlarged EU as the EU25.
2The monetary-union channel is explored in Kollmann (2004) in the context of a two-
country computable general equilibrium model.
3The non-EU15 countries are those that do not enter the EU15. Similarly, the non-
EU25 countries will be those that do not enter the EU25.
3eliminated between the EU15 and the acceded countries but they remain un-
changed between the EU15 and the non-acceded countries. In the context of
the three-country model, we address the following two questions. First, how
can the introduction of poor non-acceded countries aﬀect the model’s predic-
tions about the EU15 and the acceded countries? Second, how can the EU
accession of some transition countries aﬀect the remaining (i.e., non-acceded)
transition countries?
The presence of border costs complicates the solution procedure consid-
erably: our multi-country model has occasionally binding inequality con-
straints, so that equilibrium allocation is in general not interior, and policy
functions have a kink. One-country model with occasionally binding in-
equality constraints is extensively studied in Christiano and Fisher (2000),
however, to the best of our knowledge, similar multi-country models had not
been studied yet. To simplify the computation of equilibrium, we use two
complementary strategies, one is to reduce the number of Kuhn-Tucker con-
ditions by establishing some properties of equilibrium analytically, and the
other is to cast a three-country model into a two-country model by using
aggregation theory. In addition, we restrict the admissible set of initial con-
ditions to be consistent with the optimal policy functions; this allows us to
reduce the number of state variables in the model.
We calibrate the model to match the population sizes and the capital
stocks of the EU15, the newly acceded and the non-acceded groups of coun-
tries, and we compute the transitional dynamics. Our main ﬁndings are
as follows: In the short-run, the implications of the model under the non-
accession and the accession scenarios are similar both qualitatively and quan-
titatively. To be speciﬁc, under both scenarios, a large initial diﬀerence in
the MPC between the rich EU15 and the poor non-EU15 (acceded or non-
acceded) countries leads to massive capital ﬂows from the former to the latter
countries; this decreases (increases) wages, output and consumption in the
EU15 (the non-EU15) countries. The long-run consequences of the non-
accession and the accession scenarios are however very diﬀerent: under the
former scenario, residents of the non-acceded countries eventually buy out
all the domestic capital from EU15 investors, while under the latter scenario,
EU15 investors keep holding a part of the acceded country’s capital forever.
Quantitatively, the last eﬀect can be very large: in our benchmark model,
EU15 investors end up owning more than 75% of the acceded country’s cap-
ital.
Why does the presence of non-zero border costs under the non-accession
4scenario make the EU15 country eventually withdraw its FDI from the non-
acceded country? This is because domestic investors, who face no border
costs, overcompete foreign investors in the long-run. To be precise, as the
non-acceded country develops, the diﬀerence in the MPC between the EU15
and the non-acceded countries goes down and becomes insuﬃcient to cover
the border costs. At this point, investing in the non-acceded country is no
longer proﬁtable for foreigners but it is still proﬁtable for residents. As a
result, residents gradually buy out all the domestic capital from foreigners.
In contrast, under the accession scenario, there are no border costs, so that
EU15 investors face the same rate of return on capital as do investors of
the acceded country and hence, have no incentives to withdraw their capital
from the acceded country. Therefore, the situation when EU15 investors hold
most of the acceded country’s capital perpetuates forever.
As far as welfare is concerned, our model predicts that the capital trade
is beneﬁcial for both the rich EU15 and the poor non-EU15 (acceded or
non-acceded) countries independently of the scenario considered: the EU15
countries gain in welfare because they get additional capital income from
their FDI, while the non-EU15 countries gain in welfare because they can
instantaneously raise their living standards. In our model, the EU enlarge-
ment is a win-win process in the sense that it increases welfare gains from
capital trade for both the EU15 and the acceded countries relative to the
non-accession scenario. Finally, under the empirically plausible parameteri-
zations, our model implies that the 2004 EU accession of the eight transition
countries should not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the economies of the non-acceded
transition countries.
Our analysis is related to the following FDI literature. First, our model
has the endowment motive for FDI, which is parallel to the one in Help-
man (1984), and Helpman and Krugman (1985) where multinational corpo-
rations exploit factor-price diﬀerentials across countries by means of verti-
cal (resource-seeking) FDI. Secondly, we share with Markusen and Venables
(1998) the result that local producers can eventually force out foreign pro-
ducers, however, we have a diﬀerent underlying mechanism for this result: in
our model, the advantage of domestic producers lies in the absence of bor-
der costs, while in their model, it lies in the possibility of creating vertical
linkages with other domestic producers. Thirdly, our border costs can be
viewed as a measure of distance (in a broad sense) between countries, and
they are similar to the distance measures used in the FDI gravity literature,
e.g., trade freight costs and tariﬀs in Brainard (1997). Fourthly, the three-
5country variant of our model is similar to the three-country model of the
export-platform FDI constructed in Ekholm, Forslid and Markusen (2003),
although there are also important diﬀerences between the two models: their
model is richer than ours in that they have both FDI and trade, while we
are limited to FDI, however, their analysis is partial-equilibrium and static,
while our analysis is general-equilibrium and dynamic. Finally, our study is
related to recent empirical literature investigating the determinants of FDI
in transition countries.4
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the
empirical relation between the EU enlargements, FDI and border costs. Sec-
tion 3 develops a dynamic multi-country general-equilibrium model of the
EU enlargement where FDI is subject to border costs. Section 4 describes
the methodology of the numerical study and presents the simulation results.
Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 EU enlargements, FDI and border costs
The history of the European Union (EU) begins in 1951, when six European
countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg and Netherlands)
establish the European Coal and Steel Community. Over the 1951-2004 pe-
riod, the EU experienced ﬁve enlargements: it is joined by Denmark, Ireland
and the UK in 1973; by Greece in 1981; by Portugal and Spain in 1986;
by Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995; and ﬁnally, by Cyprus, Czech Re-
public, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovak Republic
and Slovenia in 2004. In Table 1, for each enlargement, we provide the pop-
ulation size, the total GDP, and the GDP per capita of the EU and the
acceded groups of countries. For the V-th enlargement, we consider two dif-
ferent groups, one includes all acceded countries and the other is composed
of only transition acceded countries; the two groups diﬀer in the presence
of Cyprus and Malta. Furthermore, In Table 1, we report the statistics
for three alternative groups of the non-EU25 countries: the ﬁrst group con-
sists of both the developed European countries (Norway, Switzerland and
Turkey) and the transition countries (Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Be-
4See, e.g., Lankes and Venables (1996), Baldwin, Francois and Portes (1997), Di Mauro
(2000), Grabbe (2001,2003), Buch, Kokta and Piazolo (2001), Aslund and Warner (2002),
Egger and Pfaﬀermayr (2002), Deichmann et al. (2003), Carstensen and Toubal (2004),
Henriot (2003).
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Table 1. Selected statistics for the EU and the non-EU countries: the five EU enlargements.  
 
 
Notes: Statistics are computed for the date of the corresponding EU enlargement.  
The statistics “GDP per capita ratio” is a ratio of the GDP per capita of a group of countries in a row to that of the EU in the 
corresponding year.  








































Acceded (Denmark, Ireland, UK) 64.11  12.53  0.80 















Acceded (Greece)  9.64  10.70  0.56 
















Acceded (Portugal, Spain) 48.42  11.08  0.52 















Acceded (Austria, Finland, Sweden) 21.90  27.03  1.20 
EU15 (EU12, Austria, Finland, Sweden) 378.98  27.20  1.00 
Acceded all (Cyprus, Malta, Czech Rep., Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Rep., Slovenia)  74.34 4.65 0.18 
Acceded only transition (Czech Rep., Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Rep., Slovenia)  73.57 4.55 0.17 
Non-acceded all (Norway, Switzerland,  Turkey, Albania, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Rep., Moldova, Russia, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Bulgaria, Romania ) 
405.80 3.30 0.13 
Non-acceded only transition (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Rep., Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Bulgaria, Romania ) 















Non-acceded only transition EU25-neighbours (Albania, Croatia, 
FYR Macedonia, Belarus, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania )  98.48 1.51 0.06 larus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Georgia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Romania; Russia, Tajikistan, Turk-
menistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan); the second group consists only of the above
transition countries; and ﬁnally, the third group includes only the transition
countries that are the EU-neighbors (i.e., have common borders with the
EU25 member states). The ﬁrst and the third groups are constructed to
obtain an upper and lower bounds of the non-EU25 population.
As is seen from Table 1, at the moment of accession, the countries acceded
the EU had on average lower GDP per capita than the old EU member states
did. (The IV-th enlargement is an exception here since Austria, Finland and
Sweden had higher GDP per capita than the EU’s average). In the case of
the V-th enlargement, the output diﬀerence between the EU15 and the ac-
ceded countries is particularly large: at the moment of accession, the average
acceded country produced only 18% of what the average EU15 country did.
The empirical literature ﬁnds that the EU enlargements were accompa-
nied by considerable FDI inﬂows to the acceding countries, see, e.g., Baldwin,
Francois and Portes (1997), Grabbe (2001), Egger and Pfaﬀermayr (2002).
Regarding the ﬁrst four enlargements, Grabbe (2001) argues that the coun-
tries that were furthest behind the EU at the moment of accession (Ireland,
Greece, Portugal and Spain) experienced the largest FDI inﬂows. As far as
the V-th enlargement is concerned, Egger and Pfaﬀermayr (2002) document
the large anticipatory eﬀects of the EU enlargement on FDI: the Eastern
European countries that in 1994-1995 applied to join the EU had a signiﬁ-
cant increase in FDI inﬂows over the 1995-1998 period. Furthermore, Åslund
and Warner (2002) report that in 2000, the CEE group of countries (which
includes the acceded transition countries, and Bulgaria and Romania) had
the FDI in percentage of GDP equal to 5.9%, which is almost four times
larger than that of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) group of
countries equal to 1.6%.
To understand why the acceded countries experience an increase in FDI,
we shall ﬁrst review some ﬁndings of empirical literature on the determinants
of FDI. In the transition context, Lankes and Venables (1996) provide evi-
dence from a survey of senior managers of 117 western manufacturing ﬁrms
and conclude that a ﬁrm’s decision to undertake a FDI project depends on the
host country’s progress in economic transition, local market size, factor costs,
access to EU markets, political stability and regulatory environment. Grabbe
(2001) emphasizes the importance of factors such as expanded markets, open
borders, common regulatory environment and lower transportation costs for
8cross-border business. Grabbe (2003) adds to the previous list such factors as
the visa and Shengen border regimes and greater integration of the acceded
countries with the EU member states. EIU and E&Y (2002) argue that the
main FDI determinants are a country’s risk, transaction costs, market size
and the quality of infrastructure. Deichmann et al. (2003) identify a signif-
icant impact of social capital, labor skills, infrastructure, trade policy and
market reforms on a country’s FDI appeal. Carstensen and Toubal (2004)
come to the conclusion that diﬀerent attractiveness of Central European ver-
sus Eastern European countries for FDI is explained mainly by diﬀerences
in capital endowments and uncertainty of the legal, political and economic
environments.5
The empirical literature on FDI determinants suggests why the EU ac-
cession magniﬁes FDI inﬂows in acceded countries. Speciﬁcally, to be able
to join the EU, a country should make a large step toward integration with
the EU member states: it should adopt the EU’s common political, economic
and legislative institutions, the common visa and border-control policies, etc.
In other words, an acceding country should become similar to the EU mem-
ber states. The integration with the EU reduces the country risk, promotes
market reforms, decreases the costs of acquiring information, reduces the
transaction costs, etc. Since the border costs go down, the country becomes
more attractive for FDI. Now, the EU investors face the common and well-
understood EU environment, rather than operate in unfamiliar (sometimes,
even hostile) conditions of non-EU countries where institutions and policies
are chosen in an idiosyncratic fashion.
To see whether the acceded countries indeed become increasingly similar
to the EU15 member states, as opposed to the non-acceded countries, we
investigate the evolution of the economic-freedom index for three groups of
countries distinguished in Table 1 (EU15, 10 Acceded and 21 Non-acceded)
over the 1996-2004 period. The economic-freedom index is designed by the
Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal to reﬂect a country’s overall
economic situation; its value ranges from 1 to 5 (with the lowest value being
the best).6 We interpret the diﬀerence between the groups’ economic-freedom
5Empirical evidence from non-transition countries is similar, namely, the main factors
aﬀecting the FDI are the economic, political and institutional stability in host economies,
see, e.g., Culem (1988), Lucas (1993), Biswas (2002).
6To be more speciﬁc, the economic-freedom index is computed on the basis of 50 vari-
ables divided in 10 broad categories, which are as follows: 1) trade policy; 2) ﬁscal burden
of government; 3) government intervention in the economy; 4) monetary policy; 5) capital
9indices to be a measure of closeness of their economic environments.
In Figure 1, we plot the mean and the within-group standard deviation of
the economic-freedom indices for each of the three groups considered. Over
the sample period, the indices of the EU15, the acceded and the non-acceded
groups are always the lowest, the middle and the highest, respectively. Ini-
tially, the indices of the acceded and the non-acceded groups were close, and
their within-group standard deviations overlapped over a large region. In
turn, the indices of the EU15 and the acceded groups were initially relatively
far, and their within-group standard deviations did not overlap. Over the
1996-2004 period, the index of the acceded group gradually moved from that
of the non-acceded group in the direction to that of the EU15 group. By
2004, the initial tendencies were reversed: now, the indices of the acceded
and the EU15 groups are close, and their within-group standard deviations
overlap over a large region, while the indices of the acceded and the non-
acceded groups are relatively far, and their within-group standard deviations
do not overlap.
We also evaluate the diﬀerences between the groups’ indices with formal
statistical tools. To be speciﬁc, for each possible three grouped pairs and for
each period, we perform the Mean Comparison (MC) t-test of the hypothesis
that the means of the two groups are equal. We do so under two alternative
assumptions, one is that the two groups have the same within-group variances
and the other is that they have diﬀerent within-group variances. Additionally,
we perform the Variance Comparison (VC) F-test of the hypothesis that the
variances of the two groups are equal. In Table 2, we provide the p-values
of the tests, and in Figure 2, we illustrate the results of the MC t-test under
the assumption of equal variances.
As we see from the table, the results of the MC t-test are similar under the
assumptions of equal and unequal variances. The hypothesis that the means
of the acceded and the non-acceded groups are equal cannot be rejected at
a5 %s i g n i ﬁcance level in the initial 1996 year, however, it can be rejected
in all subsequent years. In turn, the hypothesis that the means of the EU15
and the acceded groups are equal can be rejected at a 5% signiﬁcance level
during the 1996-2003 period, but it cannot be rejected in the last year, 2004.
Finally, the hypothesis that the mean of the non-acceded and the EU15
groups are equal can be rejected at less than a 0.01% signiﬁcance level in all
ﬂows and foreign investment; 6) banking and ﬁnance; 7) wages and prices; 8) property
rights; 9) regulation; 10) informal market activity.




















Figure 1. The evolution of the economic 
freedom indices.
EU-15: mean                 
Acceding-10: mean           
Non-acceding-21: mean       
EU-15: mean ± sd          
Acceding-10: mean ± sd    
Non-acceding-21: mean ± sd













Figure 2. P-values for the tests of the equality 
of means of the economic freedom indices.
H
0: Acceding-10 = Non-acceding-21
H
0: EU-15 = Acceding-10          
H
0: EU-15 = Non-acceding-21      Table 2. Mean Comparison (MC) and Variance Comparison (VC) tests for the EU15, the acceded and the non-acceded countries. 
 
  Test  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Ho: mean(Acceded) = mean(Non-acceded) 
p-value  0.1324 0.0456 0.0027 0.0016  0.001  0  0 0.0001 0.0001 
Ho: mean(EU15) = mean(Acceded) 
p-value  0.0001  0  0 0.0001 0.0002 0.0092  0.041 0.0329 0.0561 

































p-value  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ho: mean(Acceded) = mean(Non-acceded) 
p-value  0.1099 0.0297 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001  0  0  0  0 
Ho: mean(EU15) = mean(Acceded) 
p-value  0.0004 0.0001  0 0.0004 0.0009 0.0146  0.052 0.0385 0.0600 


































p-value  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ho: variance(Acceded) = variance(Non-acceded) 
p-value  0.2252 0.0519 0.0046 0.0337 0.0351 0.0623 0.1742 0.1157 0.0449 
Ho: variance(EU15) = variance(Acceded) 
p-value  0.2693  0.242 0.6816  0.238 0.2339 0.5055 0.5765 0.7855 0.9278 























p-value  0.0114 0.0008 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0038 0.0259 0.0321 0.0145 years. As far as the VC test is concerned, the third panel of Table 2 shows
that we can never reject the hypothesis of equal variances for the EU15 and
the acceded groups, we can always reject this hypothesis for the EU15 and
the non-acceded groups and we have a mixed pattern for the acceded and
the non-acceded groups.
Overall, the results of the tests conﬁrm the conclusions obtained from the
visual analysis of Figure 1: ﬁrst, the acceded and non-acceded countries were
similar to each other and diﬀerent from the EU15 countries, however, over the
transition period, the acceded countries become increasingly similar to the
EU15 countries and increasingly diﬀerent from the non-acceded countries.
In the next section, we present a dynamic general equilibrium model
in which the increasing institutional similarity between the EU15 and the
acceded countries reduces border costs of FDI. We use the model to assess
the consequences of the EU enlargement for the economies of the EU15, the
acceded and the non-acceded countries.
3T h e m o d e l
Time is discrete, and the horizon is inﬁnite, t ∈ T,w h e r eT = {0,1,2,...}.
There are two countries which are referred to as the EU15 country and the
non-EU15 country and which are meant to represent the groups of the EU15
and the non-EU15 countries. The countries are identical in their fundamen-
tals, i.e., preferences and technology, but they can diﬀer in their population
and initial endowments. Variables of the EU15 country are denoted by let-
ters without superscript, and those of the non-EU15 country are denoted by
letters with superscript ”n”. The population sizes of the two countries are de-
noted by v and vn, and they are constant over time. Capital is mobile across
countries, however, labor is immobile. We describe only the EU15 country;
a description of the non-EU15 country follows by a formal interchange of
variables with and without superscripts.
3.1 The EU15 country
The consumer’s side of the EU15 country consists of an inﬁnitely-lived repre-
sentative agent who can invest both in the domestic and the foreign countries.






tu(ct,1 − ht) (1)
subject to
ct + kt+1 + φt+1 = wtht +( 1− d)(kt + φt)+rtkt + γr
n
t φt, (2)
where ct,h t,k t+1,φ t+1 ≥ 0, and initial condition (k0,φ 0) is given. Here, ct,
ht, rt and wt are, respectively, consumption, hours worked, interest rate and
wage in the EU15 country; kt is capital rented to domestic producers; φt is
capital rented to foreign producers; δ ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor; d ∈ (0,1]
is the depreciation rate of capital. The total time endowment is normalized
to one and hence, the term (1 − ht) represents leisure. Finally, γ ∈ [0,1] is a
fraction of the non-EU15 interest rate, rn
t ,t h a ti sp a i do nt h eE U 1 5c a p i t a l
stock held in the non-EU15 country, and it reﬂects border costs for the EU15
investors when investing in the non-EU15 country.
The producer’s side of the EU15 country consists of a representative ﬁrm
producing the output commodity from capital, Kt,a n dl a b o r ,Ht,a n dm a x -
imizing period-by-period proﬁts
πt =m a x
Kt,Ht
{F (Kt,H t) − rtKt − wtHt}, (3)
where F has constant returns to scale, is strictly concave, continuously dif-
ferentiable, strictly increasing with respect to both arguments and satisﬁes
the appropriate Inada conditions.
3.2 Competitive equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium is deﬁned as a sequence of the consumers’ alloca-





t+1}t∈T; a sequence of the pro-
ducers’ allocations, {Kt,H t}t∈T and {Kn
t ,Hn
t }t∈T; and a sequence of prices
{rt,w t}t∈T and {rn
t ,w n
t }t∈T such that given the prices:
(i) for each country, the corresponding consumer’s allocation solves the utility-
maximization problem (1), (2);
(ii) for each country, the corresponding producer’s allocation solves the
proﬁt-maximization problem (3);
(iii) all markets clear.
14We restrict our attention to a ﬁrst-order recursive equilibrium such that
the countries make all their decisions according to time-invariant policy func-
tions of the current state variables.
In order to derive the equilibrium conditions, we shall ﬁrst notice that,
in equilibrium, both the EU15 and the non-EU15 consumers rent some of
their capital to producers in their own countries, i.e., kt+1 > 0 and kn
t+1 > 0
and all t. Indeed, if consumers in both countries rented capital to foreign
producers, they could have saved on border costs by interchanging some of
their capital invested abroad on domestic capital.
With this result, the EU15 agent’s problem (1), (2) yields the following
set of First Order Conditions (FOCs):
u2 (ct,1 − ht)=wtu1 (ct,1 − ht), (4)
u1 (ct,1 − ht)=δu1 (ct+1,1 − ht+1)(1− d + rt+1), (5)
u1 (ct,1 − ht) ≥ δu1 (ct+1,1 − ht+1)
¡





where condition (6) holds with equality if φt+1 > 0, and it holds with strict
inequality if φt+1 =0 . Here, and further in the text, yi denotes the ﬁrst-order
partial derivative of function y with respect to argument i.
Further, according to (3),t h eE U 1 5ﬁrm’s proﬁt-maximization conditions
are:
rt = F1 (Kt,H t) and wt = F2 (Kt,H t). (7)







and Ht = ht. (8)
That is, since capital is mobile and labor is immobile, the capital used in
domestic production, Kt, can be rented from both domestic and foreign con-
sumers, while the labor input, Ht, can include only domestic labor.
We shall assume that the EU15 country has larger initial endowment per
capita than does the non-EU15 country. Under this assumption, there could
exist only capital ﬂows from the EU15 to the non-EU15 country but not vice
versa, i.e., φt ≥ 0 and φ
n
t ≡ 0 for all t. As a consequence, the only border
costs that matter for our analysis are those aﬀecting investment from the
EU15 to the non-EU15 countries, γ; the border costs from the non-EU15 to
the EU15 countries, γn, are irrelevant.
153.3 Environments
We analyze four diﬀerent environments. The ﬁrst three environments are
deﬁned within our baseline two-country setup by varying border costs. We
speciﬁcally consider inﬁnitely large border costs, positive ﬁnite border costs
and zero border costs, which imply the values of γ =0 , γ ∈ (0,1) and
γ =1 , respectively. Zero (positive) border costs correspond to the case
when the EU15 and the non-EU15 countries form (do not form) an economic
union. Our fourth environment comes from a three-country variant of the
model. To be precise, we assume that, initially, there are one EU15 country
and two identical non-EU15 countries. Subsequently, one of the non-EU15
countries forms an economic union with the EU15 country eliminating border
costs, γ =1 , whereas the other non-EU15 country remains outside the union
continuing to have positive ﬁnite border costs, γ ∈ (0,1). We show that such
a three-country model can be cast into our baseline two-country framework.
In our simple model, the accession of a country to the EU occurs instan-
taneously: border costs between the EU15 and the acceded country are fully
eliminated at the moment of accession. In reality, the accession process is
more sophisticated: ﬁrst, a country applies to join the EU; secondly, the mem-
bership is awarded; thirdly, the formal accession takes place; and ﬁnally, the
country is gradually integrated in the EU institutions over the post-accession
period. Therefore, the eﬀects of accession on border costs are extended in
time. In particular, there might be an anticipatory eﬀect because rational
agents foresee the accession and adjust their behavior correspondingly. In
the paper, we make no distinction between the anticipatory, immediate and
ex-post eﬀects of the enlargement.
3.3.1 Autarky
If border costs are inﬁnitely large, γ =0 , then the EU15 country never invests
in the non-EU15 country,
φt+1 =0for all t,( 9 )
which means that the two countries are in autarky.
3.3.2 No non-EU15 country accedes the EU
Under positive ﬁnite border costs, γ ∈ (0,1),w es o l v ef o rφt+1 by using
conditions (5)−(7). Suppose that the Euler equation (6) holds with equality,
16which implies that rt+1 = γrn
t+1, so that by taking into account the market










I ft h e r ei sap o s i t i v ev a l u eo fφt+1 satisfying (10),t h e ni ti sas o l u t i o n ;o t h e r -
wise the solution is φt+1 =0 . In the latter case, the EU15 country does not
invest in the non-EU15 country because it is less proﬁtable than investing in
the domestic production.
3.3.3 All non-EU15 countries accede the EU
If the EU15 and the non-EU15 countries form an economic union, so that
border costs disappear, γ =1 , capital moves from the former country to the
latter country until both countries have the same interest rates, rt+1 = rn
t+1.
The optimal φt+1 is therefore a solution to (10) under γ =1 .
3.3.4 Some non-EU15 countries accede the EU, and others do not
Let us denote with superscripts o and a variables of the old EU country (the
one that constituted the EU before the EU enlargement, i.e., the EU15) and
the newly acceded country, respectively. We continue to use superscript n
for denoting variables of the non-EU country, which corresponds now to the
non-acceded country. As was said, after the EU enlargement, border costs
between the old EU and the acceded countries become zero, γ =1 ,a n d
those between the old EU and the non-acceded countries remain positive,
γ ∈ [0,1).
Although we have now three diﬀerent countries, we can still analyze their
interactions in the context of our two-country framework. This is possible
because, in the absence of border costs, we can replace the old EU and the ac-
ceded countries with a single representative country by using the aggregation-
based construction described in Maliar and Maliar (2003). To be speciﬁc, let
us assume that the enlarged EU is ruled by a social planner and let us deﬁne
the social momentary utility function of the enlarged EU by





























vo + va = ht
¾
, (11)
17where variables without subscripts are those of the enlarged EU in per capita
terms, and λ
o and λ
a are welfare weights assigned by the planner to the rep-
resentative consumers of the old EU and the acceded countries, respectively.
For the sake of convenience, we normalize the average welfare weight to unity
by λovo+λava
vo+va =1 . The representative consumer of the enlarged EU solves the
intertemporal utility-maximization problem (1), (2), where initial condition
















ﬂows from the old EU and the acceded countries to the non-acceded coun-
tries, respectively. The production side of the enlarged EU consists of the
representative ﬁrm, which solves the proﬁt-maximization problem (3).T h e
population of the enlarged EU is v ≡ vo + va.
As far as the welfare weights λ
o and λ
a are concerned, their values corre-


























0),s ∈ {o,a}. (12)
This constraint is obtained by using forward recursion of the budget con-
straint (2) and by imposing the transversality condition, see Maliar and
Maliar (2001) for more details.
In general, constructing the social utility function and ﬁnding the equi-
librium welfare weights are complicated tasks, which are to be performed by
numerical methods.7 However, if the economy is consistent with Gorman’s
(1953) aggregation, we can construct the social utility function analytically
and derive a closed-form expression for the equilibrium welfare weights. We
therefore study the quantitative implications of the model under the assump-
tion of Gorman’s (1953) type of preferences. In Appendix A, we describe the
corresponding aggregation results as a part of our solution procedure.
Once the social utility function of the enlarged EU is constructed, we
can characterize the equilibrium dynamics of the enlarged EU and the non-
acceded countries by the equilibrium conditions (4) − (8), and in particular,
we can compute the amount of capital ﬂowing from the enlarged EU to the
7To be speciﬁc, one can use the following iterative procedure: assume some welfare
weights, compute the social utility function (11), solve for the individual and aggregate
allocations and check the life-time budget constraints (12); iterate on the weights until the
planner’s solution satisﬁes the life-time budget constraints.
18non-acceded country, φt+1,u n d e rγ ∈ (0,1) as is described in Section 3.3.2.
As a ﬁnal remark, we shall mention that the two-country setup of Section
3.3.3 with no border costs can be equivalently restated as the planner’s prob-
lem described above.
4 Numerical analysis
In this section, we ﬁrst describe the methodology of our numerical study, and
we then present simulation results.
4.1 Methodology
To assess the quantitative implications of the model, we are to choose func-
tional forms for the utility and the production functions, and to calibrate










, σ>0, µ ∈ (0,1). (13)
This function is homothetic, so that it is consistent with Gorman’s (1953)





t , α ∈ (0,1). (14)
The assumptions (13) and (14) are standard to the macroeconomic literature.
We choose the model’s time period to be one quarter. We calibrate the
parameters so that in the steady state, the autarkic variant of our model
generates hours worked h =0 .31, as estimated in a microeconomic study
by Juster and Staﬀord (1991), and it reproduces three basic observations on
the euro area, as described in Smets and Wouters (2003), namely, the share
of capital income in output α = rk
y =0 .3, the consumption-to-output ratio
c
y =0 .73 and the capital-to-output ratio k
y =8 .8, where variables without







the values of the parameters {d,δ,µ} = {0.0257,0.9938,0.3307}, see Maliar
and Maliar (2001).
19Concerning the initial capital stock, we assume that the EU15 country
starts from the steady state and that the non-EU15 country is initially en-
dowed with 15% of the steady state capital, which roughly matches the GDP
per capita diﬀerence between the EU15 and the non-EU15 countries in 2004,
as reported in Table 1. As the population sizes regard, on the date of the V-
th enlargement, the population of the EU15 was 378.98 millions, that of the
acceded countries was 73.57 millions and that of the non-acceded countries
was in the range from 98.48 to 405.80 millions depending on how the non-
acceded group is deﬁned (see Table 1). To make the model approximately
consistent with these ﬁgures, we assume that the EU15 population is equal
to 5, that the population of the acceded countries is equal to 1 and that the
population of the non-acceded countries ranges from 1 to 5.
The value of the risk-aversion coeﬃcient σ and that of the border-cost
parameter γ are not identiﬁed by our calibration procedure. In the bench-
mark case, we assume σ =2and γ =0 .9. The latter value implies that
the eﬀective interest rate faced by foreign investors is 10% lower than that
faced by domestic investors. Furthermore, we perform sensitivity analysis
with respect to these two parameters by considering the values of γ =0 .8
and σ =5 .
To solve the model, we employ a version of the Euler-equation method
that ﬁnds a solution to the equilibrium conditions (4) − (8) on a grid of
prespeciﬁed points. Our program is written in Matlab. A detailed description
of our solution method is provided in Appendix B.
4.2 Two-country model
We shall start by presenting the results for the two-country variant of the
model. In Figure 3, we illustrate the transitional dynamics obtained under
the benchmark parameterization (vn =1 , σ =2 , γ =0 .9) by plotting the
key model’s variables over the ﬁrst 100 periods. In addition, in the ﬁrst
panel of Table 3, we provide some statistics characterizing the transitional
dynamics, namely, we report the short run (t =0 )and the long-run (t →∞ )
percentage diﬀerences between the values of the model’s variables under the
non-accession (accession) scenario and those under the autarkic scenario.
As it is seen from the ﬁgure, under the autarkic scenario (inﬁnitely large
border costs, γ =0 ), there is a large initial diﬀerence in the interest rates
between the EU15 and the non-EU15 countries, which is due to very dif-
ferent levels of initial savings. (Variable ”savings” is deﬁned as the total





















Figure 3. Transitional dynamics in the two-country model: the benchmark case.
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Table 3. Selected statistics on transitional dynamics in the two-country model. 
 




Country  Interest 










Benchmark model: v = 5, v
n = 1, σ = 2, γ = 0.9. 
NAC  EU15,  t=0 11.224 -4.457  0  -15.018 17.673 -5.480 -3.997 -1.071  0.004 
 EU15,  t=∞ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Foreigners  leave n-EU15,  t=0  -71.557 71.399  0  500.612  -83.350 70.833 71.746 -0.331  0.373 
after 53 periods  n-EU15, t=∞ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AC  EU15,  t=0 13.125 -5.148  0  -14.543 17.018 -3.327 -5.966  1.920  0.009 
 EU15,  t=∞  0  0 15.555 -0.455 16.082 -0.454  0.204 -0.454  0.204 
Foreigners  n-EU15,  t=0  -73.964 78.019  0  484.774  -82.899 52.254 93.756  -14.473  0.536 
stay forever  n-EU15, t=∞  0  0 -77.774  2.270 -78.267  2.270  -1.020  2.270  -1.030 
 
Sensitivity with respect to the population size v
n: v = 5, v
n = 6, σ = 2, γ = 0.9 
NAC  EU15,  t=0  55.452 -17.227  0 -49.265  97.101 -21.131 -15.473  -4.716  0.075 
 EU15,  t=∞ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Foreigners  leave n-EU15,  t=0  -60.247 48.490  0  273.692  -73.240 48.555 48.450  0.044  0.206 
after 58 periods  n-EU15, t=∞ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AC  EU15,  t=0  64.303 -19.169  0 -47.295  89.736 -13.405 -21.758  7.131  0.157 
 EU15,  t=∞  0  0 67.629 -1.974 71.004 -1.974  0.887 -1.974  0.879 
Foreigners  n-EU15,  t=0  -62.185 51.705  0  262.752  -72.433 37.175 60.580 -9.578  0.285 
stay forever  n-EU15, t=∞  0  0 -56.357  1.645 -57.064  1.645  -0.739  1.645  -0.745 
 
Sensitivity with respect to the border-cost parameter γ: v = 5, v
n = 1, σ = 2, γ = 0.8 
NAC  EU15,  t=0  9.252 -3.721  0  -13.502 15.609 -5.499 -2.922 -1.847  0.002 
 EU15,  t=∞ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Foreigners  leave n-EU15,  t=0  -68.569 64.217  0  450.056  -81.820 72.888 58.921  5.280  0.283 
after 35 periods  n-EU15, t=∞ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AC  EU15,  t=0 13.125 -5.148  0  -14.543 17.018 -3.327 -5.966  1.920  0.009 
 EU15,  t=∞  0  0 15.555 -0.455 16.082 -0.454  0.204 -0.454  0.204 
Foreigners  n-EU15,  t=0  -73.964 78.019  0  484.774  -82.899 52.254 93.756  -14.473  0.536 
stay forever  n-EU15, t=∞  0  0 -77.774  2.270 -78.267  2.270  -1.020  2.270  -1.030 
 
Sensitivity with respect to the risk-aversion coefficient σ: v = 5, v
n = 1, σ = 5, γ = 0.9, κ0
n=0.15k. 
NAC  EU15,  t=0 10.121 -4.047  0  -13.980 16.252 -5.274 -3.497 -1.278  0.020 
 EU15,  t=∞ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Foreigners  leave n-EU15,  t=0  -69.083 65.381  0  466.000  -82.332 74.992 60.608  5.811  2.474 
after 84 periods  n-EU15, t=∞ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AC  EU15,  t=0 11.904 -4.706  0  -14.564 17.046 -4.394 -4.846  0.328  0.046 
 EU15,  t=∞  0  -0 16.031 -0.470 16.579 -0.468  0.209 -0.468  0.836 
Foreigners  n-EU15,  t=0  -71.724 71.833  0  485.453  -82.919 65.543 74.957 -3.661  3.525 
stay forever  n-EU15, t=∞  0  0 -80.164  2.352 -80.620  2.342  -1.047  2.338  -4.315 
 
Notes: “NAC” and “AC” are abbreviations for the non-accession and the accession scenarios, respectively. Statistics in columns (3)-(6) and 
(8)-(11) are percentage differences between the values of the varaibles under the given scenario and those in the associated autarkic 
economy. Statistic in column (7) is capital outflows from a country in percent of the country’s capital stock.  
 
 capital holdings of the country’s residents, kt + φt; in autarky, savings are
equal to kt). Consequently, if border costs are either entirely removed, as is
under the accession scenario (γ =1 )or suﬃciently reduced, as is under the
non-accession scenario (γ =0 .9), the rich EU15 country re-allocates a part
of its capital stock to the poor non-EU15 acceded or non-acceded country,
respectively. This eﬀect can be appreciated by looking at the capital and
the capital-outﬂow charts in the ﬁgure (variables ”capital” and ”capital out-










v , which is equal to φt for the EU15 country and which
is equal to −φt
v
vn for the non-EU15 country). As follows from Table 3, in
the short-run, international capital ﬂows are roughly of the same size under
the accession and the non-accession scenarios: the EU15 country’s capital
decreases by about 15%, while the non-EU15 country’s capital increases by
about 500%. As a consequence of capital outﬂow, in the short-run, the EU15
country (the non-EU15 country) faces a reduction (an increase) in wages,
output and consumption.
While the model has similar short-run implications under the accession
and the non-accession scenarios, it has very diﬀerent long-run implications.
Under the non-accession scenario, the EU15 capital fully exits the non-
acceded country in the long-run. (According to Table 3, in the benchmark
case, the exit of foreigners occurs after 53 periods). Consequently, all the
eﬀects associated with international capital ﬂows are temporal, and both
the EU15 and the non-acceded countries will end up in the same (autarkic)
steady state. In contrast, under the accession scenario, the eﬀects associ-
ated with international capital ﬂows are permanent.8 The EU15 country’s
investors become owners of most capital installed in the acceded country
taking away proﬁt opportunities from the acceded country’s investors for-
ever. Since the EU15 residents hold not only the capital stock installed in
their own country but also a large fraction of capital installed in the acceded
country, in the long-run, savings of the EU15 residents are about 15% higher
8In fact, our results under the accession scenario are similar to those obtained in a
partial equilibrium setup where an inﬁnitely small, developing economy is opened to capital
ﬂows from an inﬁnitely large, developed rest of the world. Such a setup produces no
transitional dynamics: the developing economy experiences an inﬁnitely large inﬂow of
capital and goes to a steady state in one period. In our general-equilibrium setup with
economies of ﬁnite sizes, we do observe transitional dynamics, however, the transitional
patterns are fairly ﬂat.
23than in autarky. As a consequence of higher capital income, the EU15 agents
enjoy larger consumption and leisure than in autarky. On the contrary, the
a c c e d e dc o u n t r y ’ sa g e n t se n du pw i t hs m a l l e rc o n s u m p t i o na n dl e i s u r ei nt h e
long-run because their savings are about 75% l o w e rt h a ni na u t a r k y . 9
Why does the presence of non-zero border costs make the EU15 coun-
try eventually withdraw its capital from the non-acceded country? Initially,
t h e r ei sal a r g ed i ﬀerence between the autarkic interest rates in the EU15
and the non-acceded countries, so that it is proﬁtable for the EU15 agents
to invest abroad in spite of border costs. However, over the process of eco-
nomic development, the diﬀerence in the autarkic interest rates goes down
and eventually becomes smaller than border costs, so that the EU15 agents
are better oﬀ by investing only in their own country. Indeed, when the EU15
residents invest its capital in the non-acceded country, they earn the interest
rate which is γ times lower than the one faced by the non-acceded country’s
investors, rn
t+1, i.e., rt+1 = γrn
t+1. In particular, as the interest rate earned by
the non-acceded country’s investors rn
t+1 goes down below r/γ,t h ei n t e r e s t
rate earned by the EU15 investors rt+1 becomes lower than the steady state
one, r. By this time, the EU15 investors should have withdrawn all their
capital from the non-acceded country, because in their own country, they
can earn the interest rate, which is at least as high as the steady state one,
r. After the exit of foreigners, the non-acceded country continues its devel-
opment in autarky, and its interest rate, rn
t+1,g o e sf r o mr/γ to its limiting
steady state value r. In contrast, under the accession scenario, there is no
reason for the EU15 investors to withdraw their capital from the acceded
country because in the absence of border costs, both the EU15 and the ac-
ceded country’s investors face the same interest rate, rt+1 = rn
t+1.T h u s ,t h e
situation when the EU15 investors hold most of the acceded country’s capital
perpetuates forever.
It is interesting to note that in the short-run, the non-EU15 agents work
more under the non-accession scenario than under the accession scenario,
however, in the long-run, the opposite is true. This tendency can be explained
as follows: Under the non-accession scenario, agents have the possibility
9Under the previous four EU enlargements, the diﬀerence in initial endowments between
the EU and the acceded countries (Denmark, Ireland, UK, Greece, Portugal, Spain, etc.)
was much smaller than that under the current EU enlargement. As a result, if the model is
calibrated to the previous enlargements, all the eﬀects discussed above are of much smaller
magnitude. In particular, investors of the old EU-member states do not take over such a
large share of the acceded country’s capital.
24to buy out the domestic capital from foreigners. Hence, they work a lot
until they get the ownership of all the domestic assets and use the resulting
increment in their capital income to raise consumption and leisure forever.
In contrast, under the accession scenario, the presence of foreign capital is
permanent. As a consequence, agents of the acceded country have a small
capital income, so that, in the long-run, they are to work more and consume
less than in autarky (see Table 3). Furthermore, as is seen from the ﬁgure,
output follows the same time patterns as does labor under both the non-
accession and the accession scenarios.
Let us now turn to the welfare implications of the model. The relevant
measure of welfare is life-time utility of the representative agent computed in
period t =0 .W es h a l lﬁrst notice that the EU enlargement has a relatively
small eﬀect on welfare of the EU15 country, namely, it increases life-time
utility only by 0.009% relative to autarky (see Table 3). The eﬀect of the
EU enlargement on welfare of the acceded non-EU country is however more
sizable: here, life-time utility increases by 0.536% relative to autarky. Under
the non-accession scenario, the welfare gains are smaller for both the EU15
and the non-acceded countries, and they, respectively, amount to 0.004% and
0.373%, relative to autarky. Investing in the non-EU15 country is beneﬁcial
for the EU15 investors because they can earn a higher interest rate and hence,
a larger capital income. In turn, an inﬂow of foreign capital is beneﬁcial for
the non-EU15 country because it instantaneously leads to a higher wage and
consequently, a larger labor income.
As follows from the above discussion, both the EU15 and the non-EU15
countries have the same rankings of the scenarios in period t =0 :t h e y
prefer the accession scenario to the non-accession one, and they prefer the
non-accession scenario to the autarkic one. We shall notice, however, that the
ranking of the scenarios changes for the non-EU15 country if, as a measure
of welfare, we consider life-time utility not in period t =0but in some period
which is suﬃciently advanced in the future. Speciﬁcally, after the ﬁrst few
periods, the non-accession and the autarkic scenarios start yielding higher
welfare for the non-EU15 country than does the accession scenario. (Recall
that under the accession scenario, the acceded country faces a permanent
reduction in capital income because it loses the ownership of most of its
capital). Thus, if the non-EU15 country’s government had an objective to
maximize long-run welfare instead of welfare in t =0 , it would decide not
to accede to the EU. Concerning the EU15 country, we do not have such
a ranking reversal since welfare for this country is always larger under the
25accession scenario than under the non-accession one. (Moreover, welfare
gains for the EU15 country from the EU enlargement increase substantially
over time, from 0.009% in the short-run to 0.204% in the long-run relative to
autarky). Thus, the EU15 country’s government would be in favor of the EU
enlargement independently of whether it maximized short-run or long-run
welfare.
4.3 Three-country model
We now turn to the three-country variant of our model. In the benchmark
case, we assume vo =1 , va =1 , σ =2and γ =0 .9. We plot the obtained
transitional dynamics in Figure 4, and we present the corresponding numeri-
cal results in the ﬁrst panel of Table 4. As is seen from the ﬁgure, transitional
dynamics of the old EU and the acceded countries are qualitatively the same
as those we had in the two-country model for the EU15 and the acceded
countries, respectively. Quantitatively, all the eﬀects for the EU15 country
are almost two times larger now than they were in the two-country case.
This is because in the three-country setup, the EU15 country invests in both
the acceded and the non-acceded countries with the total population equal
to 2, whereas in the two-country setup, it invested only in the non-EU15
(acceded or non-acceded) country with the population equal to 1.O n t h e
contrary, for the acceded country, all the eﬀects are somewhat reduced be-
cause in the presence of the third country, it receives less investment from
the EU15 country.
The three-country model has a new important feature, compared to the
two-country model, namely, it allows us to evaluate how the accession of
some countries to the EU aﬀects the non-acceded countries. It is clear that a
country’s accession to the EU makes it more attractive for the EU15 investors
since border costs disappear. As a consequence, the EU15 country shifts a
part of its foreign investment from the non-acceded country to the acceded
country, which causes a reduction in capital, wages, labor, output and con-
sumption in the non-acceded country. To evaluate the magnitude of such
a reduction in the non-acceded country’s variables, in Table 4, we provide
a maximum percentage diﬀerence between the values of each non-acceded
country’s variable when the other non-EU15 country accedes and the corre-
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be seen, the reduction eﬀect is relatively modest: the value of ∆max ranges
from 0.62% for wages to about 5% for capital inﬂows. The decrease in welfare





















Figure 4. Transitional dynamics in the three-country model: the benchmark case.
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Non-EU countryTable 4. Selected statistics on transitional dynamics in the three-country model. 
 




Country  Interest 










Benchmark model: v = 5, v
ℓ = 1, v
n = 1, σ = 2, γ = 0.9  
NAC  o-EU,  t=0 21.502 -8.008  0  -25.793 34.757 -9.837 -7.187 -1.988  0.014 
 o-EU,  t=∞ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Foreigners  leave  acceded,  t=0 -68.929  65.029  0 429.877 -81.128  64.641  65.266  -0.235  0.325 
after 57 periods  acceded, t=∞ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AC  o-EU,  t=0 23.282 -8.580  0  -25.118 33.543 -7.684 -8.982  0.980  0.020 
 o-EU,  t=∞ 0 0  16.251  -0.474  16.805  -0.474  0.213  -0.474  0.213 
Foreigners acceded,  t=0 -71.626  71.578  0 413.188 -80.514  45.612  87.438 -15.134  0.492 
stay forever  acceded, t=∞ 0 0  -81.254  2.371  -81.688  2.371  -1.065  2.371  -1.077 
∆
max(NAC,AC)  for  non-acceded  1.465 -0.621  3.467 -3.248  4.997 -1.910 -1.215 -1.353  0.032 
 
Sensitivity with respect to the population size v
n: v = 5, v
ℓ = 1, v
n = 5, σ = 2, γ = 0.9 
NAC  o-EU,  t=0  55.452 -17.227  0 -49.265  97.101 -21.131 -15.474  -4.716  0.075 
 o-EU,  t=∞ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Foreigners  leave  acceded,  t=0 -60.247  48.490  0 273.692 -73.240  48.555  48.450  0.044  0.206 
after 58 periods  acceded, t=∞ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AC  o-EU,  t=0  56.889 -17.553  0 -48.395  93.779 -19.037 -16.886  -1.800  0.085 
 o-EU,  t=∞ 0 0  18.385  -0.537  19.023  -0.537  0.241  -0.537  0.241 
Foreigners acceded,  t=0 -63.891  54.737  0 255.377 -71.861  28.323  70.871 -17.071  0.385 
stay forever  acceded, t=∞ 0 0  -91.922  2.683  -92.134  2.683  -1.205  2.683  -1.220 
∆
max(NAC,AC)  for  non-acceded  0.925 -0.394  2.653 -2.285  3.696 -1.388 -0.847 -1.002  0.026 
 
Sensitivity with respect to the border-cost parameter γ: v = 5, v
ℓ = 1, v
n = 1, σ = 2, γ = 0.8 
NAC  o-EU,  t=0 17.774 -6.771  0  -23.570 30.839 -9.986 -5.327 -3.448  0.008 
 o-EU,  t=∞ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Foreigners  leave  acceded,  t=0 -66.117  59.015  0 392.837 -79.709  66.987  54.145  5.014  0.248 
after 31 periods  acceded, t=∞ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AC  o-EU,  t=0 21.427 -7.984  0  -23.939 31.474 -7.642 -8.137  0.371  0.016 
 o-EU,  t=∞ 0 0  16.0185  -0.4673  16.5632  -0.4673  0.2099  -0.4673  0.2095 
Foreigners acceded,  t=0 -72.053  72.697  0 421.182 -80.813  45.655  89.214 -15.659  0.506 
stay forever  acceded, t=∞ 0 0  -80.093  2.336  -80.547  2.336  -1.050  2.336  -1.061 
∆
max(NAC,AC)  for  non-acceded  3.102 -1.301  2.458 -5.553  6.794 -2.849 -1.992 -1.667  0.020 
 
Sensitivity with respect to the risk-aversion coefficient σ: v = 5, v
ℓ = 1, v
n = 1, σ = 5, γ = 0.9 
NAC  o-EU,  t=0 19.354 -7.302  0  -24.177 31.885 -9.502 -6.314 -2.373  0.072 
 o-EU,  t=∞ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Foreigners  leave  acceded,  t=0 -66.491  59.772  0 402.941 -80.117  68.533  55.420  5.484  2.183 
after 88 periods  acceded, t=∞ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AC  o-EU,  t=0 21.021 -7.852  0  -24.446 32.356 -8.563 -7.532 -0.773  0.108 
 o-EU,  t=∞  0.001 -0.001 16.980 -0.496 17.563 -0.495  0.222 -0.494  0.884 
Foreigners acceded,  t=0 -69.420  66.160  0 418.773 -80.724  58.640  69.895  -4.526  3.284 
stay forever  acceded, t=∞  -0.010 0.004  -84.906 2.486  -85.272 2.476  -1.106 2.472  -4.569 
∆
max(NAC,AC)  for  non-acceded  1.397 -0.593  3.911 -2.775  5.352 -1.468 -0.921 -0.914  0.159 
 
Notes: “NAC” and “AC” are abbreviations for the non-accession and the accession scenarios, respectively. Statistics in columns (3)-(6) and (8)-
(11) are percentage differences between the values of the varaibles under the given scenario and those in the associated autarkic economy. 
Statistic in column (7) is capital outflows from a country in percent of the country’s capital stock. Statistic “∆
max(NAC,AC) for non-acceded” is 
a maximum percentage difference between the values of the variables of the non-acceded country under the non-accession and the accession 
scenarios.  
 of the non-acceded country due to the accession of the other non-EU15 coun-
try is fairly small: it does not exceed 0.032%. Thus, we conclude that the
EU accession of some transition countries is unlikely to signiﬁcantly aﬀect
the economies of non-acceded countries.
4.4 Sensitivity experiments
We next examine the sensitivity of the model’s predictions to changes in the
parameters which are not uniquely identiﬁed by our calibration procedure,
namely, the population size of the non-EU15 country, vn,t h eb o r d e rc o s t ,
γ,a n dt h ec o e ﬃcient of risk aversion, σ. The statistics for these sensitivity
experiments for the two-country and the three-country models are reported
in Tables 3 and 4, respectively. The transition patterns in the sensitivity
experiments proved to be similar to those we had under the benchmark pa-
rameterization, so that we do not provide the corresponding ﬁgures.
We begin by presenting sensitivity results for the two-country model. Our
ﬁrst experiment consists in increasing the population size of the non-EU15
country from vn =1to vn =5 . (The latter value of vn corresponds to
an upper bound of the non-EU15 population, which is obtained when all
European developed non-acceded countries and all transition (both acceded
and non-acceded) countries are included in the non-EU15 group, see Table
1). As follows from Table 3, this modiﬁcation leads to a considerable initial
increase in international capital ﬂows: now, the EU15 country invests abroad
almost 50% of its total capital stock, while in the benchmark case, it invested
around 15%. A short-run cost of such capital outﬂows for the EU15 country is
enormous: now, its consumption drops by 16% and 22% relative to autarky
under the non-accession and the accession scenarios, respectively, while in
the benchmark case, the corresponding ﬁgures were 4% and 6%.O v e r a l l ,
the EU15 country however gains from investing into the non-EU15 country,
and its welfare gains are even larger now than in the benchmark case. In
particular, under the accession scenario, the EU15 country ends up with
savings, which are 68% larger than in autarky, while in the benchmark case,
this ﬁgure was 16%. For the non-EU15 country, regularities are opposite to
the above described regularities for the EU15 country: the larger is the size of
the non-EU15 country, the smaller are immediate beneﬁts and the smaller are
the long-run costs from international capital ﬂows. This is because a larger
size of the non-EU15 country implies a smaller amount of foreign investment
in per capita terms, for a given size of the EU15 country.
29In the second sensitivity experiment, we consider a two-time increase in
the size of border costs by varying the border-cost parameter from γ =0 .9
to γ =0 .8. (It is clear that this change does not aﬀect the results under
the accession scenario where, by deﬁnition, γ =1 ). Under the non-accession
scenario, the considered relatively large increase in border costs has only
am i n o re ﬀect on the statistics in the table. A noteworthy exception is
the number of periods for which the EU15 capital stays in the non-acceded
country: it decreases from 53 in the benchmark case to 35 now.
In the third experiment, we vary the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution from σ =1to σ =5 . A stronger agent’s desire to smooth
consumption path slows down capital accumulation and thus, slows down
the convergence to a steady state compared to the benchmark case: now, the
EU15 capital remains in the non-acceded country for 84 periods. Therefore,
the parameters γ and σ play a similar role in the equilibrium dynamics: their
variations aﬀect considerably the speed of convergence but not the variables’
initial and asymptotic values.
Finally, in Table 4, we provide the sensitivity results for the three-country
model. Here, we have roughly the same regularities for the old EU and the
acceded countries, as we did for the EU15 and the acceded countries, respec-
tively, in the corresponding two-country settings. As far as the third (non-
acceded) country is concerned, the diﬀerences between its variables under the
accession and the non-accession scenarios are the largest in the experiment
with large border costs, γ =0 .8, ranging from 1.3% for wages to 6.8% for cap-
ital inﬂows. Overall, the results obtained in the sensitivity experiments are
similar to those we had in the benchmark experiments. This is true for both
the two-country and the three-country variants of the model. We therefore
conclude that the predictions of the model are robust to the modiﬁcations
considered.
5C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
In this paper, we develop a dynamic general equilibrium model with the aim
of studying the impact of the EU enlargement on the economies of the EU15,
the acceded and the non-acceded countries. We focus on one particular
aspect of the EU enlargement, which is the abolition of border costs for
investing from the EU15 to the acceded country. In a calibrated version of
the model, we ﬁnd that the eﬀe c t sa s s o c i a t e dw i t hc a p i t a lﬂows from rich
30EU15 countries to poor transition countries are very large: in the short-run,
the EU15 investors can become owners of 70%−80% of the total capital stock
of the transition countries independently of whether such countries accede
the EU or not. How does this prediction agree with empirical evidence from
transition economies? In the data, the presence of foreign capital in transition
economies during the pre-accession period was not so large as predicted by the
model but still fairly ample. For example, in 1999, the share of ﬁrms under
foreign control in manufacturing employment in Czech Republic, Poland and
Hungary was 16.2%, 18.6% and 46.5%, respectively; and, in 2000, the FDI
s t o c ki nC z e c hR e p u b l i c ,H u n g a r ya n dE s t o n i aw a s42.6%, 43.4% and 53.2%
of their GDP, respectively; see Henriot (2003).
The crucial diﬀerence between the non-accession and the accession scenar-
ios in our model consists in the long-run outcomes: the presence of foreigners
is only temporary in a non-acceded country, whereas it is permanent in an
acceded country. This fact should be taken into account by policy makers, for
example, an acceded country might wish to artiﬁcially introduce some border
costs in order to protect itself against an excessive presence of foreign capital
in the long-run. An interesting extension of our model would be therefore to
endogenize border costs by making it a policy variable of acceded country.
Needless to say, our results should be treated with caution since our model
abstracts from several potentially important issues. First, in our model, an
acceded country adopts the EU environment at the moment of accession
(meaning that border costs are instantaneously and fully eliminated), while
in reality, an acceded country experiences complicated and gradual changes
in its environment over the pre- and post-accession periods. Secondly, we
assume that foreign and domestic capital are perfectly substitutable in pro-
duction, while empirical evidence indicates that foreign capital creates posi-
tive spillovers in the domestic production, see, e.g., Görg and Strobl (2001).
Thirdly, in our model, a high return on capital in transition countries is
the only reason for FDI, while the empirical literature argues that FDI can
also be a means of extending control for corporate-strategy reasons, see, e.g.,
Graham and Krugman (1989), Markusen and Venables (1998), Ekholm et al.
(2003). Finally, we are restricted to modeling the eﬀect of the EU enlarge-
ment on border costs of FDI, while the EU enlargement has also a signiﬁcant
eﬀect on migration, trade, etc. The extension of the model along these lines
is left for future research.
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6 Appendix
In this section, we ﬁrst elaborate the algorithm for solving our two-country
model, and we then describe how to restore the equilibrium allocation in the
considered three-country setup.
Two-country model In order to compute the equilibrium decision rules
in the two-country model, we do not make an explicit distinction between the
EU15 and the non-EU15 countries (except of the population sizes) and refer
to the two countries in our model as countries 1 and 2. Since we compute
the decision rules for diﬀerent initial conditions, each country can be either
rich or poor. The latter implies that investment can go from country 1 to
country 2 or visa versa, depending on the initial conditions assumed. For the
34sake of computations, we assume that both countries face identical border
costs equal to λ. However, as we already said in Section 3.2, the border costs
of investing from a poor to a rich country are irrelevant because investment
never goes in this direction.











. It turns out that for t ≥ 1,w ec a nr e d u c et h e
number of state variables from four to two. Indeed, according to the Kuhn-





















t is the total capital stock held by consumer of the country
i ∈ {1,2}.F o rt =0 , the representation (15) does not need to hold because







, i ∈ {1,2}, does not necessarily satisfy the
Kuhn-Tucker conditions (5), (6). To deal with this issue, we shall restrict
our attention to such sets of initial conditions that satisfy the Kuhn-Tucker
conditions (5), (6), so that the representation (15) also holds at t =0 .T h i s
assumption is reasonable: if it was not satisﬁed, countries would behave
suboptimally before t =0 .
We therefore solve for a recursive equilibrium, in which the countries
make their decisions according to time-invariant functions of the current state
variables (κ1
t,κ 2
t). Our solution method is close to the used in Maliar and
Maliar (2004b), however, in the present paper we parameterize not the asset
functions but the labor functions. In our model, parameterizing the labor
function is more convenient than parameterizing other functions such as the
consumption or the asset functions because we can explicitly resolve the
intratemporal FOCs, see Maliar and Maliar (2004a) for a discussion. By












,i ∈ {1,2}. (16)
The labor functions are computed on a two-dimensional grid, such that, in
each dimension, there are 100 equally-spaced points in the range [kmin,k max],
with kmin =0 .01k and kmax =1 .5k,w h e r ek is the steady state capital stock.
For the initial iteration, we assume that the consumer in each country works




To solve for the equilibrium prices (the interest rates and wages), we ﬁrst
distinguish all grid points where country 1 invests in country 2.I f t h i s i s
35the case, then r1
t = γr2
t, so that under the assumption of the Cobb-Douglas























Solving (17) with respect to φ
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According to the Kuhn-Tucker conditions (5), (6),i fφ
1
t > 0,t h e ni ti sa
solution. In the same way, we can distinguish all grid points where φ
2
t > 0,














t,f o ri ∈ {1,2},a n dt h e n ,ﬁnd the
corresponding interest rates from (7). Given the interest rates, we compute
wages, wi
t =( 1− α)(ri
t/α)
α
α−1,f o ri ∈ {1,2}.
We subsequently compute consumption in the two countries from the in-
tratemporal FOC (4), which, under the CRRA utility function (13) assumed,








,i ∈ {1,2}. (19)
We then restore the next-period savings, κ1
t+1 and κ2
t+1, from the budget
constraint (15).
As a next step, we perform the same calculations for period t +1 ,a sw e












we use linear polynomial interpolation, namely, Matlab’s routine ”interp2”.












We can now check whether the assumed labor functions in (16) satisfy the
Euler equations of the two countries. For this purpose, we combine the Euler
equation (5) with the intratemporal FOCs (4) to eliminate consumption, so
























36By computing b hi
t in each point of the grid, we deﬁne the new labor functions
b =i (κ1
t,κ 2
t) ≡ b hi





equal with a given degree of precision, then the equilibrium is found and we
stop the iterations. Otherwise, we continue iterations by updating the labor


























where η ∈ (0,1]. We use a convergence criterion that the labor functions
diﬀer on two subsequent iterations by less than 10−9 according to the least-
square norm.
Three-country model I no r d e rt oc o m p u t eas o l u t i o nt ot h et h r e e - c o u n t r y
setup of Section 3.3.4, we ﬁrst construct a representative consumer for the
enlarged EU. It can be shown by using the deﬁnition (11) that if consumers
have identical CRRA utility functions (13), then the social utility function
coincides with the consumers’ utility function, up to a multiplicative constant
which does not aﬀect equilibrium (see Proposition 2 in Maliar and Maliar,
2003). Under this aggregation result, we can replace the two countries of the
enlarged EU with one composite EU country and compute the equilibrium
allocation and prices in the enlarged EU and the non-acceded countries by
solving the two-country model, as is discussed above.
Given the allocation and prices of the enlarged EU, {ct,h t,k t+1,φ t+1}t∈T
and {rt,w t}t∈T, respectively, we now restore the equilibrium allocations of the
old EU and the acceded countries. The deﬁnition (11) implies that the indi-







t =1− (1 − ht)f
s,s ∈ {o,a}, (22)





Maliar and Maliar (2003) for details of derivations. To identify the welfare
weights corresponding to the given distribution of initial endowments, we
substitute cs
t and hs


















,s ∈ {o,a}, (23)
37where u1 (cτ,h τ)=( cτ)
µ(1−σ)−1 (1 − hτ)
(1−µ)(1−σ). We approximate the inﬁ-
nite summations in (23) by summations of the length 10000,w h i c hy i e l d s
an accurate approximation for the welfare weights. Once the welfare weights
are known, we compute consumption and working hours of countries o and a
according to (22). We then restore the total savings of the two countries, κo
t+1
and κa
t+1, by using the budget constraints (15), and we use the equilibrium
interest rate, rt, to compute the capital stock employed in the two countries,
Ko
t+1 and Ka









t, s ∈ {o,a},a n d
condition (8).
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